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1 
When zeroing in on the primary points in the Nicomachean Ethics at which 
Aristotle explicitly discusses the nature of eudaimonia, Book I.1-5; 7 and Book X.7-8 are 
always singled out as the most crucial sections. While the entire text is filled with 
discussions that variably shine light on how Aristotle conceives of eudaimonia, it is the 
aforementioned passages that must be fully addressed and accounted for in any study of 
this topic. The importance of Book X rests on Aristotle’s overt claims about eudaimonia, 
such as “eudaimonia is coextensive with theoria” (NE 1178b28), and the argument that 
the practical virtues1 only attain a “secondary” form of eudaimonia (NE 1178a8). These 
very clear statements about eudaimonia would rightfully puzzle a person initially 
approaching this topic from the outside since it seems for Aristotle there is no ambiguity 
about his characterization of eudaimonia, and if Aristotle had placed these passages at the 
beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, this would seem even more to be the case. The 
controversy over interpretation arises, however, because of the characterization of 
eudaimonia that Aristotle gives in Book I. Here Aristotle works through a discussion 
about the relationship between activities and their ends to a conclusion that eudaimonia is 
the highest of all possible ends, and that eudaimonia is ultimately “an activity of the soul 
in conformity with excellence or virtue” (NE 1098a16), which Aristotle identifies with 
the human ergon, translated as “function” or “characteristic work.” Book I, then, seems 
to argue for a broader characterization of eudaimonia that is composed of virtuous
                                                           
1
 The phrase “practical virtues” will throughout this paper be used to designate the case of the active 
exercise in a particular action of any of the practical virtues as this action arises from habit as per 
Aristotle’s designation of virtue. 
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activities in general, typically assumed to be a mix of theoria and the practical virtues, 
and as the discussion continues over the intervening books, it is obvious that Aristotle 
highly values the practical virtues. The claims about eudaimonia in Book X, therefore, 
leave many readers puzzled as to why Aristotle singles out theoria, or contemplation, as 
the pinnacle activity of eudaimonia while relegating the practical virtues to a secondary 
position since prima facie both would seem to satisfy the description of eudaimonia 
given in Book I.  
Due to the unexpected manner by which Aristotle concludes Book X, as viewed 
through the lens of Book I, interpreters have roughly divided themselves into two camps: 
those that read Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia with an exclusivist sense and those that 
read it with an inclusivist sense. Now what exactly is meant by each of these terms has 
some internal divergence, sometimes significant, in how each sense is understood. In 
general, however, the exclusivist reading takes it that eudaimonia is a single good, 
emphasizing the claim made in Book X that “eudaimonia is coextensive with theoria,” 
while the inclusivist reading takes eudaimonia as a composite of goods, namely, theoria 
together with the practical virtues. The intent of this paper will be to reconstruct 
Aristotle’s central argument about the well-lived life, or eudaimonia, as it is presented in 
the Nicomachean Ethics for the purposes of clarifying why Aristotle comes to privilege 
theoria in Book X. The course of this study, however, will be to reveal how the claims in 
Book X are informed by Aristotle’s account in Book I and to demonstrate why Aristotle 
concludes that both theoria and the practical virtues are able to attain eudaimonia. The 
position that will be forwarded herein is then best represented with the designation of 
being a “dominant inclusive” reading in which theoria and the practical virtues are both 
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understood as being able to attain eudaimonia and are both necessary to the well-lived 
life, but due to the nature of theoria it is able to attain a superlative measure of 
eudaimonia and so will be favored, although not exclusively so. 
Aristotle’s account of the well-lived life is unique in that it seeks to unify two 
initially disparate intuitions, namely, that eudaimonia is something that is aimed at, that 
is, it is an end goal at which point there is nothing further to obtain, and that eudaimonia 
is necessarily active and is therefore something that is engaged in, pursued, or, quite 
simply, done. On this account, the well-lived life is, as it were, both the race and the 
medal won. Understanding this unity, and understanding why Aristotle appeals to the 
human ergon as the locus for this integration in Book I, is the crucial element for any 
interpretive account of the well-lived life from the text because it reveals the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for eudaimonia. Building upon the analysis of this unity, I will 
argue that the claim made in Book X that “eudaimonia is coextensive with theoria” gains 
meaning or significance only in light of Aristotle’s conception of the human ergon as 
virtuous activity. This is meant to counter the problem with certain exclusivist readers of 
eudaimonia that, in trying to find a place for the practical virtues, integrate them from the 
starting place of theoria, that is, they seek to justify the practical virtues in light of 
theoria. I will argue that instead the proper approach is to understand how theoria and the 
practical virtues are both able to satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions that 
Aristotle enumerates for eudaimonia as virtuous activity, and in that sense both are able 
to fully and independently attain eudaimonia. In doing so, it will, nevertheless, also be 
important to point to why theoria is privileged, namely, because it is able to more fully 
satisfy these criteria due to its particular nature. The practical virtues are eudaimonia in a 
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“secondary” sense not because they are an analogue to theoria,2 or because they are a 
teleological approximation of theoria,3 or because they promote theoria.4 Instead, the 
practical virtues are just as able to attain eudaimonia as theoria insofar as they instantiate 
virtuous activity; however, they are only able to attain a “secondary” sense of eudaimonia 
because they are not able to be consistently performed so as to satisfy the important but 
often overlooked criteria of eudaimonia as something practiced over a complete lifetime 
(NE 1098a18). On this account, the practical virtues, when taken alone, are understood as 
being a satisfactory instantiation of eudaimonia insofar as they are a form of virtuous 
activity, but they only attain a “secondary” form of eudaimonia because they are unable 
to be continuously practiced. The person who is striving to attain a well-lived life then 
has open to him or her two means for fulfilling the demand of eudaimonia that it be a 
form of virtuous activity. When exercised in conjunction with theoria, the practical 
virtues can then be understood as an alternative means by which the human person, while 
striving to be divine by means of theoria but being unable to do so fully because of his or 
her human nature, is nevertheless able to satisfy the demand that the well-lived life be 
something continually and actively engaged as virtuous activity. Given human nature, the 
well-lived life would then be one that is necessarily composed of both theoria, as the best 
instantiation of eudaimonia, and the practical virtues, as the mode of virtuous activity 
found in everyday sociality. 
                                                           
2
 David Charles, “Aristotle on Well-being and Intellectual Contemplation” Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 73 (June 1999): 205. 
 
3Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 195. 
 
4
 Richard Kraut, “Reply to Professor Roche” in The Crossroads of Norm and Nature ed. May Sim 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995), 145. 
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With Aristotle’s conclusion in Book I that the highest good is eudaimonia, and 
that eudaimonia consists in the “activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or 
virtue,” it is important to first have a clear understanding of what Aristotle means by a 
good. Aristotle takes it that all purposive human activities have some end that they are 
seeking to realize in virtue of their particular natures as activities. Using the example of a 
craft that Aristotle cites, bridle-making, this craft aims to produce bridles for riding 
horses, and the craft of bridle-making is wholly determined by its product, the bridle. 
When a person engages in an activity, in this case the craft of bridle-making, that person 
is doing so in order to bring about a particular end, namely, the end that is determined by 
its respective activity. While all activities have an end that they seek to bring about and at 
which they aim, every end is also that for the sake of which the activity is chosen. The 
ends of these activities are then the good that is sought by undertaking the activity. In the 
case of crafts, the fact that we refer to their products as goods, that is, as material wares, 
bolsters Aristotle’s conclusion that the end an activity seeks to realize is a good. 
However, the sense of “good” that Aristotle is invoking is not merely a material good. 
Rather, Aristotle is making a claim about human desires. When a person desires 
something, again consider the example of a bridle, one is able to satisfy that desire by 
engaging in activities that are aimed at attaining the object of desire, in this case engaging 
in bridle-making to attain a bridle. The end at which an activity aims, the product, then 
converges with the object that the human being desires, the good (NE 1094a18). The 
observation that each activity has a particular good that it results in and that is that for the 
sake of which a person engages in that activity is what yields the definition of the good as 
that at which all things aim (NE 1094a3).  
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While every purposive human activity has an end, and therefore every activity has 
a good, for Aristotle, not all goods are equal. Instead, activities can be grouped into 
hierarchies depending upon whether the goods that they are seeking to realize are 
subordinate to some further activity and its respective good (NE 1094a6-15). For 
example, Aristotle understands the good of bridle-making, namely, a bridle, to be 
subordinate to the good of the activity of horsemanship due to the fact that a bridle’s 
purpose is to be used for riding horses. The value of each activity can then be measured 
by the place its particular good occupies in a hierarchy of goods. The higher the activity 
in the hierarchy, the higher its good is relative to other goods, and so the designation of 
the highest good would, then, be the end of the best activity. Aristotle identifies 
eudaimonia as the highest good (NE 1095a15-17), and so the principal focus becomes 
what human activity aims at or has its end in eudaimonia, that is, what activity is the 
highest or best activity. The analysis, however, is not that simple as a problem arises with 
the fact that eudaimonia does not relate to an activity in the same way that a product 
relates to its craft. Instead, Aristotle points out that eudaimonia is itself an activity, it is 
“the same as “living well” and “doing well”” (NE 1095a19). If living-well is the highest 
thing a person can desire, as per its nature as the highest good, eudaimonia is equally a 
living, that is, it is something actively exercised by a person since living implies activity 
of some kind. Paradoxically, it would appear that in order to determine in what 
eudaimonia consists, Aristotle will need to discover an activity that, unlike most activities 
that aim at some end or product, instead aims at further activity.5 
                                                           
5
 It is important to point out that the relationship in eudaimonia of an activity aiming at activity is not the 
same sort of relationship that is found in the case of the crafts in which, for example, the activity of bridle-
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Metaphysically, Aristotle is able to appeal to his concept of energeia, or actuality, 
as a means for satisfying the need for something that is both an activity and an end. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle first references the idea of energeia when he is discussing 
the varying ways in which ends relate to their respective activities (NE 1094a3-4),6 but 
his independent treatment of energeia occurs in Metaphysics Theta 6. Corresponding to 
the division between a kinesis and an energeia, Aristotle asserts that an end can relate to 
its activity in one of two ways. In the first case, that of a kinesis, or motion, the end is a 
product that exists outside of the activity and is something towards which the activity is 
working to complete (Metaph. 1048b19). The activity-end relationship of a kinesis can 
most readily be seen in productive activities such as house-building and, to use 
Aristotle’s example from the Nicomachean Ethics, bridle-making. In these cases, the end 
that the activities are aiming at is the completed product of a house or a bridle, 
respectively, and the activity is undertaken for the sake of the end product. The activity 
itself is not complete until the end product is complete; one cannot say that one has built 
a house until the house is complete in all of its parts, and the same goes for a bridle. 
Contrasted with a motion, or kinesis, an energeia, or actuality, has its end internal to the 
activity itself and the end is realized in each instantiation of the activity (Metaph. 
1048b22-25). Rather than working towards some end beyond the activity, the end of an 
energeia is just the activity itself, and the activity is pursued for its own sake. In this way, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
making aims at the activity of horsemanship insofar as the product of bridle-making, the bridle, is used by 
the horse rider. In the case of crafts, the activity aiming at activity relationship is only indirect by means of 
the intervening good. For eudaimonia, the activity aiming at activity relationship is a direct one; the initial 
activity is only chosen for the sake of the activity and not because it has a product that is used by the further 
activity. 
 
6
 Aristotle also utilizes his concept of energeia at length in his discussion of pleasure in NE Book X. 4. 
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simply doing the activity is enough to claim that one has attained the end for which one 
has sought by engaging in the activity. One example of an energeia that Aristotle cites is 
that of “seeing,” in which the end of having had a perception of something is always fully 
contained within each instance of seeing. One cannot, as it were, see more than what one 
is already seeing in any individual moment; subsequent acts of seeing may allow a person 
to get a better view of some particular object or scene, but each moment of seeing does 
not contribute to a further, more complete perception in the way that each moment of 
building contributes to a more complete building. Seeing, as with all other energeia, fully 
attains the end that is sought in each instance of that activity. 
Among activities, every energeia is its own end, and the active exercise of an 
energeia never fails to realize its end. This characteristic of energeia is then the essential 
element in understanding why Aristotle ultimately identifies the human ergon, or virtuous 
activity, as the highest good. When setting out the necessary characteristics of an agent 
performing virtuous actions, Aristotle argues that the person “must choose to act the way 
he does, and he must choose it for its own sake” (NE 1105a32). Virtuous actions are their 
own end, that is, in order to engage in a virtuous action one must intend to perform the 
virtuous action for no other reason than that it is virtuous. The human ergon, then, is 
unique in that it is both an activity and an end; by engaging in virtuous activity, one is 
also aiming at successfully completing virtuous activity insofar as one must chose to do it 
for its own sake. Virtuous action can, then, never fail in realizing its end because each 
instance of acting virtuously is completely fulfilling the end that is sought by engaging in 
it. If a virtuous action were somehow to fail to fulfill its end, which is what would occur 
if the action were engaged with the intention of some material gain, for example, then it 
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would cease being an instance of virtuous activity. By focusing on the human ergon, 
Aristotle puts his analysis in the singular position of being able to identify something that 
will both respect eudaimonia’s active element and also satisfy the condition that 
eudaimonia be an end, which satisfies the need for an activity that, while aiming at its 
end, is in fact aiming at further activity. Yet thus far the appeal to the nature of the human 
ergon as an actuality or energeia has only satisfied the dual demands of eudaimonia 
being both an activity and an end. Aristotle’s overall argument is not just that virtuous 
activity aims at some good but rather that it aims at the highest good, and in aiming at the 
highest good also is the highest good. What is it about the nature of the human ergon that 
leads Aristotle to conclude that it will bring about eudaimonia for that person? 
 Clues about why Aristotle singles out virtuous activity for eudaimonia can be 
found just prior to his presentation of the ergon argument when he first introduces the 
idea of a human ergon (NE 1097b33-1098a7). Here Aristotle considers various 
candidates for the ergon of man that echo his hierarchy of the soul in De Anima (DA 
413a20-b26). In this text, Aristotle singles out and identifies various faculties, or 
dunameis, of the soul that living things possess dependent upon their level of complexity. 
At the most fundamental level, all things that are living are considered as being ensouled, 
and so the first dunamis of a living thing is simply living. Aristotle then works up from 
this most basic dunamis to identify the faculties of nutrition and growth, which all plants 
and animals share, and then sense perception, which distinguishes animals from plants, as 
subsequent levels in the hierarchy of the soul. The top of Aristotle’s hierarchy is 
inhabited by nous, or mind, which is the distinctive faculty that humans possess over and 
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above the other dunameis of plants and animals and is what allows a person to know and 
understand.  
The argument for a human ergon in the Nicomachean Ethics relies heavily upon 
this psychological framework. Aristotle considers each faculty in turn as a possible 
candidate for the human ergon but rejects those dunameis of the lower hierarchy because 
they are not peculiar, or idion, to humans. It is only the rational soul, of which nous is a 
part, that is distinctive of humans, and it is specifically the active exercise of the rational 
element that Aristotle identifies with the human ergon (NE 1098a5-7). The qualification 
that it be the active exercise and not merely the possession of the rational element is of 
course crucial for satisfying the requirement that eudaimonia be something that is 
actively done.  
The fact that the human ergon resides at the top of the hierarchy of the soul also 
discloses that of the various activities of the soul with which a person can be engaged, it 
is the active exercise of the rational element that is the best activity a person can 
undertake. In the case of the human ergon, Aristotle not only identifies what is distinctive 
of humans but he also points out what is the best activity that can be done by a person. 
Although engaging in the activities of nutrition, growth, movement, and sense perception 
are crucial to a person’s well-being, if this is all that a person does he or she would fail to 
be truly human. The reason is that these other operations of the soul do not depend upon 
or require the exercise of the rational part of the soul, while the active exercise of the 
rational element is the best activity in a hierarchy of activities because the rational 
element is the highest faculty of the soul. Yet Aristotle adds a caveat. It is not just the 
active exercise of the rational element that is the best activity, but rather it must be the 
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active exercise of the rational element “in conformity with excellence or virtue.”7 While 
performing the human ergon is good, it is only the well performed ergon that can be 
considered best. It is now apparent why Aristotle turns towards the human ergon in order 
to further clarify eudaimonia. If eudaimonia is the highest good obtained through action, 
then it would be most reasonable to assume that the best activity performed in the best 
manner possible would aim at the highest good. Aristotle’s purpose in discussing the 
human ergon is then to establish the best activity of a human being so that we can better 
understand its characteristic aim. In this manner, Aristotle’s analysis reflects another 
important methodological feature of the De Anima in which, having identified the faculty 
of the soul, Aristotle goes on to analyze the activity of the faculty and its respective 
object. In the case of the Nicomachean Ethics, the faculty of the soul that is of concern is 
the rational element, which furnishes the activity of the human ergon and its object, 
eudaimonia, as a central concern of his text.  
 Situating the ergon argument in the context of Aristotle’s understanding of 
energeia reveals how Aristotle was able to consider eudaimonia as both an activity and 
an end. Furthermore, by understanding how the human ergon is situated in the hierarchy 
of the soul, it becomes clear why Aristotle considered virtuous activity as the best activity 
and as the highest good, namely, eudaimonia. The major turns in the argument of Book 
I.1-7 can then be set out in the following manner: 
                                                           
7
 All actions involving the rational element are such that they can be done in conformity with virtue or 
excellence because, unlike digestion, for example, activities like bridle-making require an element of 
decision for their exercise. Digestion happens whether one thinks about it or not, while activities such as 
crafts can be undertaken with the requirements of excellence in mind, namely, that they be done by one 
“who sets high standards for himself” (NE 1098a8). Virtuous actions are, then, necessarily actions that 
involve the rational element.  
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[E1] The human ergon is an activity of the soul in accordance with excellence or 
virtue. 
 
[E2] Virtuous activity is an activity of the soul in accordance with excellence or 
virtue. 
 
[E3] Virtuous activity is chosen for its own sake and can only be chosen for its 
own sake (by definition of virtue). 
 
[E4] Virtuous activity has its end in successfully acting virtuously (on account of 
being an energeia). 
 
[E5] Virtuous activity is the best activity that a person can engage in (due to its 
place in the hierarchy of the soul as the human ergon). 
 
[E6] The highest good is the end of the best activity (parity of activity and ends). 
 
[E7] The end of the best activity is acting virtuously (from E4 and E5). 
 
Therefore, the vision of the well-lived life that Aristotle is forwarding in Book I.1-7 is:  
 
The highest good is acting virtuously, and the well-lived life consists in and aims 
at virtuous actions. 
 
 Aristotle made significant strides in providing a determinate content to 
eudaimonia by appealing to the human ergon; yet, curiously, upon concluding the ergon 
argument in Book I.7, he thinks that the most that he has provided is an outline or sketch 
of the good, the details of which can be filled in at another time (NE 1098a20). The 
shortcoming with the analysis up to this point is that even though Aristotle has identified 
the specific type of human activity that will attain eudaimonia for a person, which is 
virtuous activity, he has still not sufficiently concretized the activity in a particular action 
that can be engaged in. Virtuous activity is only a type or category of action, but it in 
itself is not something that can be actively done by a person; in the same way a living 
being cannot simply be a mammal, but instead it must be a particular type of mammal 
such as a dog. The actions that a person performs may be a virtuous action, but one 
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cannot do virtuous activities simpliciter. To call a particular action virtuous is to claim 
that it has certain features, or more precisely, the agent performing the action must have 
certain characteristics, namely, that the agent deliberately chooses to act in that way and 
that the action is chosen for its own sake (NE 1105a32). Yet these types of characteristics 
can be applied to a person performing a number of different actions, including facing an 
enemy that is threatening one’s homeland, contributing to the benefit of one’s friends and 
neighbors, or thinking about the relationship between a triangle’s sides, to name just a 
few. Although these activities are similar in kind insofar as they can all be performed 
virtuously, and would thus be acting courageously, being generous, and contemplating, 
respectively, one could not and would not say that therefore they are the same actions. 
Virtuous activity needs to be sufficiently concretized in particular actions that a person 
can undertake. Eudaimonia, then, needs to be realized in particular virtuous actions since 
virtuous activity, as a type of action, cannot itself be undertaken.  
In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle works to develop his conception 
of eudaimonia further by identifying the best concrete action that satisfies the criteria of 
the best type of activity – virtuous activity. Toward this end, Aristotle opens chapter 
seven of Book X by looking for the highest human virtue since, if eudaimonia is activity 
in conformity with virtue, “it is to be expected that it should conform with the highest 
virtue” (NE 1177a12). The concern with virtue, and in particular a highest or best virtue, 
directly harkens back to the conclusion of the ergon argument in Book I.7 where 
Aristotle indicates that eudaimonia is not only an activity “in conformity with excellence 
or virtue,” but he also added the stipulation, “and if there are several virtues, in 
conformity with the best and most complete” (NE 1098a16). By discovering the highest, 
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or best, virtue of the human soul, Aristotle reasons that one can identify the best activity 
that a human can engage in by singling out that activity that is associated with the best 
human virtue. Aristotle then looks to identify the highest virtue by relying upon his 
teleological reasoning. Assuming that the highest virtue would correspond to the highest 
faculty of the soul, Aristotle identifies the part of the soul that “is itself divine or most 
divine thing in us” (NE 1177a15), namely, the intellect or nous, as the highest part of the 
soul. From this, Aristotle deduces that it is the activity of this part of the human soul, the 
best part, in conformity with its particular virtue that would constitute eudaimonia. 
Aristotle then singles out theoria as the activity of the highest part of the human soul, 
namely nous, and therefore theoria is the activity that best realizes eudaimonia as a 
virtuous activity (NE 1177a18). Since theoria is an activity of the soul that arises solely 
from the intellect, or rational element, then it seems that Aristotle has easily identified the 
concrete activity that will attain eudaimonia for human beings. It was pointed out earlier, 
however, that all virtuous activity involves the active exercise of the rational element in 
some sense, and thus the concern voiced by some commentators as to why Aristotle 
uniquely privileges theoria since many other actions would be able to fulfill the criteria 
for eudaimonia set out in Book I, especially the practical virtues. The comparisons that 
Aristotle provides between theoria and the practical virtues in Book X will rise to the 
forefront in determining why Aristotle privileges theoria, and the conclusion argued here 
will be that the most substantial argument that Aristotle has for favoring theoria is that it 
can be more easily practiced continually, and thus it can more easily satisfy the demand 
that eudaimonia is coextensive with the active exercise of virtuous activity. 
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 Now before continuing, it is important to be clear what Aristotle has in mind 
when he argues that theoria is the best human activity. The typical translation of theoria 
as contemplation brings with it particular connotations that exist for the English word 
“contemplation” that do not exist for “theoria.” Aristotle indicates that the activity of the 
intellect, or theoria, is the most divine thing that a human being can engage in, and he 
considers it as divine both because it is the action that is attributed to the gods (NE 
1178b21) and because the objects of theoria are the most divine things (NE 1177a20). 
These divine objects are commonly identified with the fundamental principles of what 
Aristotle considers the contemplative sciences, such as theology, mathematics, and 
physics. For example, theoria would be concerned with such things as the stars and their 
motions or the basic properties of numbers or figures and their relationships such as are 
found in geometry. In this regard, Aristotle appropriated the noun theoria as a technical 
term developed from the more commonly used verb theorein, which had the meaning “to 
speculate” in the sense of “to observe a spectacle.”8 Theoria translated as 
“contemplation” is accurate insofar as it indicates a manner of gazing thoughtfully upon 
an object, but is inaccurate at least insofar as contemplation can indicate one’s thoughtful 
reflection upon any number of different objects. For Aristotle, nous, of which theoria is 
the activity, is only concerned with the most fundamental principles of the universe (NE 
1141a9-20) and not, for example, a pleasant ocean vista. However, understanding the 
particular objects of theoria is only a part of what Aristotle has in mind when he invokes 
                                                           
8
 Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural 
Context (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6. 
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theoria as best activity; it is also important to understand the metaphysical underpinnings 
of theoria’s operation. 
In De Anima II.5, Aristotle distinguishes various degrees of potentiality and 
actuality in his metaphysics and applies this schema to human knowledge. At the lowest 
level, that of first order potentiality, a human being has knowledge in the sense that a 
human being is capable of having knowledge (DA 417a22-23). The person does not yet 
have any particular piece of knowledge, but he or she has the potential to know things in 
virtue of being a human who has the proper faculties of soul for knowledge. At the next 
level, that of a second order potentiality-first order actuality, a human being has 
knowledge of a particular discipline, such as geometry. In this case, the human being 
actually possesses a particular piece or collection of knowledge but the person may not be 
actively utilizing this knowledge, for example, because the person is studying seashells 
left along the shoreline instead of the principles of geometry. This form of knowledge is 
then potential knowledge in the sense that the person does possess the knowledge and 
could recall it to mind, and it is actual knowledge in the sense that the person does in fact 
have knowledge of some object or body of learning. At the top of this hierarchy, for 
Aristotle, is the active contemplation of knowledge, such as would be the case of the 
geometer presently thinking his or her knowledge of the particular relationship between 
the sides and angles of a triangle (DA 417a27). Here, the human being as a knower is 
fully actualized by the person actively thinking about a piece of knowledge that is known 
with certainty.9 Aristotle’s characterization of theoria, or contemplation, is then very 
                                                           
9
 One key supposition of Aristotle is that actual knowledge is always true, that is, something is only known 
when in fact it is true. “We understand a thing simpliciter whenever we think we are aware both that the 
17 
 
specific in that it is not just an indeterminate pondering about an object, such as is the 
case of someone contemplating a pleasant view, but rather it is the active and deliberate 
thinking about a particular piece of knowledge that is in fact known by the person 
contemplating. Only this active exercise of thought can be considered as an instance of 
theoria. 
 Earlier in the discussion, it was pointed out how, in setting up the problem of in 
what eudaimonia consists, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia must be something that is 
actively and consistently practiced since it is not just an end state that is achieved but is 
also a life to be lived. Aristotle then relies heavily upon his concept of energeia in order 
to single out an activity that achieves its end in each instance of its exercise. 
Understanding theoria as the active contemplation of knowledge squarely situates theoria 
as an energeia insofar as it is the active thinking of some object that always achieves its 
end in thinking about the truth of some object. The strength of theoria’s candidacy for 
eudaimonia, then, comes from the confluence of its nature as an energeia that instantiates 
the human ergon and its orientation towards what is best and most divine. Yet following 
the criteria set out in Book I, eudaimonia is something that can be realized in any activity, 
insofar as that particular activity satisfies the criteria of being a virtuous activity. On this 
point, while theoria may be the best instantiation of virtuous activity that a person can 
undertake, it is far from obvious that it is the only virtuous activity as there are many 
human activities that can be actively engaged in. For this reason, Aristotle admits that 
actions in accordance with the practical virtues, those of self-control, courage, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
explanation because of which the object is is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be 
otherwise” (PA 71b9-11). Theoria, as an active exercise of knowledge, is then always correct, and therefore 
it is the active thinking about things that are already known and that are known with certainty.  
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generosity, to name a few, all equally satisfy the criteria of a virtuous activity and, 
therefore, they can be understood as aiming at eudaimonia; however, he only affords 
them the distinction of attaining eudaimonia in a “secondary” manner (NE 1178a8).  
 It was already pointed out that Aristotle favors theoria, at least in part, because it 
is the most divine activity that a human being can engage in. As an activity of the 
intellect, theoria is divine because it consists in the solitary exercise of the intellect, or 
divine part, of the human soul. Aristotle follows similar reasoning for valuing the 
practical virtues to a lesser degree, namely, because none of the practical virtues stem 
solely from the best part of the human soul (NE 1178a13-14) but instead involve a mix of 
the intellect in the form of practical wisdom and the excellences of character and the 
emotions, which are derived from the composite nature of human beings. Furthermore, 
the practical virtues are ultimately concerned only with what is human in that they aim at 
personal well-being rather than aiming at what is divine, and so in that sense are not the 
best that can be attained by human beings. After establishing that virtuous activity in 
general is at the top of the hierarchy of all possible human activities, Aristotle introduces 
a second, derivative hierarchy that depends upon whether the activity is solely the 
product of the intellect or not. However, the mere fact that the practical virtues stem from 
the composite nature of humans, and not solely from the “most divine” part of the soul, 
should strike one as a less than satisfying reason for not considering the practical virtues 
equally as an instantiation of virtuous activity given that they nevertheless do involve the 
highest part of the soul. If being a virtuous activity of the best part of the human soul is 
enough for an action to qualify as eudaimonia, then it should not matter if one activity is 
found in the sole exercise of the intellect while another is mixed with other parts of 
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human nature. Perhaps Aristotle sensed this dissatisfaction when he introduces further 
criteria for eudaimonia in Book X.7-8, but whatever the case may be it is clear that this 
discussion is important for understanding why theoria is considered as that activity that 
best attains eudaimonia.  
Besides considering theoria as the best concrete instantiation of virtuous activity, 
Aristotle also considers theoria to be superior to the practical virtues because its exercise 
is more final, more self-sufficient, and it can more easily be performed in a continuous 
manner. The first two criteria, those of finality and self-sufficiency, were first introduced 
in Book I.7 just prior to the ergon argument when Aristotle was attempting to support his 
conclusion that eudaimonia is the highest good. It is commonly assumed, then, that when 
Aristotle returns to these criteria in the discussion on theoria in Book X that he is merely 
extending the discussion already started in Book I about the character of eudaimonia.10 
The criterion that theoria is more continuous is not introduced explicitly prior to Book X, 
but it can be seen implicitly in the demand that eudaimonia be something that is actively 
exercised and therefore that the best activity must be continuously active to qualify for 
eudaimonia. All of the criteria that Aristotle discusses about theoria must be considered 
in concert in order to understand why it attains its privileged position since theoria is not 
                                                           
10
 While this does seem to be true for the most part, there does appear to be some ambiguity in how he 
utilizes these two criteria between Book I and Book X that could reflect an uncertainty Aristotle had in 
privileging theoria, as some inclusivists have argued. It is especially apparent in the case of self-sufficiency 
whereby in Book I Aristotle defines self-sufficiency as “that which taken by itself makes life something 
desirable and deficient in nothing” with the qualification that “we define something as self-sufficient not by 
reference to the “self” alone,” that is, he assumes that the highest good would include “parents, children, a 
wife” etc. along with other external goods (NE 1097b10-15). When Aristotle then reintroduces this 
criterion into the discussion of Book X he indicates that the person possessing theoria “is able to study 
even by himself,” thereby implying that social relationships are not as important when he states “perhaps 
he could do it [theoria] better if he had colleagues to work with him” (NE 1177a34, italics mine) and how 
he says in regards to external goods that “one might even go so far as to say that they are a hindrance to 
study” (NE 1178b4). 
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only the best, but it is also the most final, the most self-sufficient, and the most easily 
practiced continuously. 
The first of these criteria, the finality criterion, is built on the argument that 
theoria is the only activity that is pursued for its own sake. Aristotle states that “theoria 
seems to be the only activity which is loved for its own sake. For while we derive a 
greater or a smaller advantage from practical pursuits beyond the action itself, from study 
we derive nothing beyond the activity of theoria” (NE 1177b1-4). Since this argument is 
in fact making two points, one about theoria and one about the practical virtues, each will 
need to be considered in turn. In the case of theoria, it is an oft repeated dictum that 
Aristotle considered theoria as something that is “useless” because it is concerned only 
with the changeless, eternal things of the universe rather than the more immediate things 
of a person’s day to day existence. The knowledge that is actively thought about in 
theoria is entirely without regard for any practical import and instead it is pursued 
exclusively for the sake of knowing. Aristotle also closely ties this claim to his 
genealogical account of the development of philosophy in Metaphysics Alpha.1 wherein 
he argues that “it was when almost all the necessities of life were supplied […] that such 
thinking [contemplation] began to be sought” (Metaph. 982b24-25). The fact that theoria 
is the most final activity of humanity is then revealed in the fact that one only is able to 
pursue it when one has already addressed all of one’s practical needs. According to these 
points, then, Aristotle argues that theoria is the superlative instantiation of eudaimonia 
because it is pursued solely for its own sake and by its very nature one is not able to 
derive any additional practical value from its exercise, which thus makes it more final or 
end-like of any activity. However, the argument in Book X.7 of the Nicomachean Ethics 
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also makes an additional claim about the practical virtues that must be considered in turn 
to fully understand how Aristotle utilizes the finality criterion.  
The second half of the argument, the claim about the practical pursuits, is quite 
puzzling in that it seems to be in direct contradiction to the characterization of virtue that 
Aristotle has built up over the entire Nicomachean Ethics. Now to be clear, Aristotle’s 
argument cites practical pursuits in general and not actions performed in accordance with 
the practical virtues. The problem, however, is that if he is ignoring here the clause from 
his initial definition of eudaimonia that it be an activity “in accordance with virtue or 
excellence” (NE 1098a15), then at most he is producing a straw-man for his argument by 
comparing the virtuous activity of theoria with the general class of practical actions, 
including those actions that are not undertaken solely for their own sake such as currying 
favor. Eudaimonia, it has already been established, must be a concrete virtuous activity, 
and so any argument comparing the theoretical to the practical must ultimately reference 
the virtuous practice of both and not merely their general exercise. 
Considering this argument as a comparison between theoria and the practical 
virtues, though, still runs into the problem that Aristotle is seemingly singling out the 
practical virtues as having an inherent practical value to them beyond the characteristic 
that all virtuous actions must be chosen for its own sake and not because of some further 
end that might be attained. If Aristotle is now intimating that the practical virtues are less 
final than theoria because they might, or even that they often do, result in some further 
good beyond simply being practiced for their own sake, which implies that they can and 
often are chosen for this practical value and not for their own sake, then it does not seem 
that his argument is making a satisfactory comparison between the two. Although it is 
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admittedly true that one could derive various advantages from the practical virtues, it is 
not altogether clear that this is anymore of a necessary aspect of the practical virtues than 
it is for theoria. If Aristotle wants to argue that the practical virtues aim at some further 
end beyond themselves, for example, that a person will be admired and gain social 
benefits by being generous, it is clear that a person could equally be admired and granted 
social benefits for being an exceptionally talented philosopher, Aristotle’s quintessential 
practitioner of theoria. The argument that theoria is more final is quite a bit more 
ambiguous than might first appear, even if Aristotle is known to consistently claim that 
theoria is something that is “useless.” 
The second of the criteria, the self-sufficiency criterion, in some degree provides 
stronger support for theoria, but it also produces a similar problem that arose with the 
finality criterion in that the manner by which Aristotle introduces his comparison ends up 
being less than satisfactory. Aristotle argues that theoria is superior to the practical 
virtues in the case of self-sufficiency because even if a person engaging in theoria 
requires the same necessities for living as any other person, the person who engages in 
actions in accordance with the practical virtues will need various external goods in order 
to exercise the practical virtues (NE 1177a27-33). Again, Aristotle’s argument has two 
claims, one about theoria and one about the practical virtues, and each needs to be 
considered in turn. It is true that theoria will not require any external goods beyond the 
basic necessities that are required for human sustenance. Theoria is solely derived from 
the intellect, and, as such, it does not need any material goods in order for it to be 
exercised since its operations do not rely upon the composite nature of humans. While 
Aristotle admits that perhaps one might be better at theoria if one has companions (NE 
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1177a34), it is obvious that in order to think actively about knowledge of divine objects 
one does not need any outside goods. By identifying eudaimonia with theoria, Aristotle 
is able to provide an account of a well-lived life that is relatively simple in the 
requirements necessary for its successful attainment.  
Aristotle juxtaposes the fairly minimal requirements of theoria with those of the 
practical virtues, which he argues not only rely upon the satisfaction of a person’s basic 
needs but also by definition require other goods for their successful exercise. Even if one 
could potentially engage in more theoria with more external goods, it is clear that they 
are not necessary components for its practice. In the case of the practical virtues, 
conversely, these actions by definition require external goods to be successfully 
practiced. As examples, Aristotle points out that “a just man still needs people toward 
whom and in company with whom to act justly, and the same is true of a self-controlled 
man, a courageous man, and all the rest” (NE 1177a30-32). One could see how the 
practical virtues require more external goods than theoria, especially in the case of 
generosity, say, where a person would require more than what would satisfy his or her 
basic needs in order to be able to give to others in addition to the need of the generous 
person to have friends and compatriots with whom to be generous. Yet, even in this case, 
it is not entirely unambiguous that to practice the practical virtues one would need more 
external goods since some of these virtues are actively exercised exactly when a person 
has fewer than his or her basic necessities met. For example, one could imagine a 
situation where a person exercises self-control during a time of famine, or in even less 
extreme of a case, when a person exercises self-control being satisfied with only having 
his or her basic needs met. In at least some of the cases of the practical virtues, it is then 
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apparent that no more external goods are needed than in the case of the practitioner of 
theoria.  Nevertheless, it is obvious that in order to be able to exercise the practical 
virtues consistently one would require more external goods than for theoria, since, for 
example, to be continually generous, one would continually need to have material goods 
that can be given away to others. This leads directly into the third criterion of eudaimonia 
that Aristotle cites in Book X.7, namely, that the activity be continuous, and it is this 
criterion that seems to be undeniably the strongest in favor of theoria. 
 Aristotle is very specific in characterizing eudaimonia as the active exercise of 
virtuous actions and not merely as the possession of a virtuous disposition. Eudaimonia is 
something that is done, and so is only attained when a person is actively engaging in the 
activity that brings it about. While the identification of eudaimonia with virtuous activity 
pointed to its existence as an actuality or energeia that contained both an activity and an 
end, Aristotle also consistently emphasized the fact that eudaimonia is something 
performed continually and “over a complete life.” Eudaimonia requires the continuous 
exercise of virtuous activity in order for it to be realized since it exists only insofar as one 
is actively exercising virtuous activity, and the fact that Aristotle believes this is 
confirmed when the claim that “theoria is coextensive with eudaimonia” is immediately 
followed up with the assertion that “the greater the opportunity for theoria, the greater the 
eudaimonia” (NE 1178b30). The claim that theoria can be practiced more continually 
than the practical virtues ties in closely with the argument that theoria is more self-
sufficient. Consider first the case of the practical virtues. Actions performed in 
accordance with the practical virtues are necessarily circumscribed by the dictates of the 
actions. For example, one can only be actively generous insofar as one is in the process of 
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providing another person with a material benefit. Once the external good has been 
granted, the person can no longer be said to be actively engaging in the practical virtue of 
generosity insofar as the specific act of generosity is no longer being exercised. That 
person may be referred to as a generous person due to his or her developed habit of being 
a virtuous person, or at least he or she can be viewed by others as being generous if he or 
she is lacking in the virtue, but for eudaimonia, the activity must be actively exercised. 
Theoria, on the other hand, can seemingly be practiced in any situation as long as the 
person is able to maintain his or her concentration long enough to be continually thinking 
about the highest objects of thought. Since theoria is not similarly circumscribed by 
external conditions, one is able to practice in a greater number of situations and over a 
longer period of time. In this case, at least, theoria is unambiguously best suited to fulfill 
the conditions of eudaimonia as something that is actively done over a complete life. 
 After drawing in these additional criteria, it becomes obvious that theoria is 
considered as the superior instantiation of eudaimonia to the practical virtues not only 
because Aristotle considers it as the highest or best activity according to his teleological 
reasoning. While there is some ambiguity as to how well the additional criteria support 
theoria, it is clear that at least taken as an aggregate, the practical virtues are, for the most 
part, less final and less self-sufficient than theoria. It is ultimately the criterion that 
eudaimonia be continuous that pushes the support for theoria as the best instantiation of 
eudaimonia over the practical virtues. Aristotle admits that both the practical virtues and 
theoria are able to attain eudaimonia as both are a type of virtuous activity; however, 
even if Aristotle’s intentions are just to provide a guide to attaining eudaimonia, he 
cannot overlook the fact that of these two activities one of them is clearly more suited to 
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the task. Yet in referencing Aristotle’s clear privileging of theoria, it is important not to 
lose sight of the fact that the practical virtues are also able to attain eudaimonia, and that 
as such, as an activity that is able to attain the highest good obtainable through action, the 
practical virtues should be highly valued. The key is then not to consider the practical 
virtues as somehow failing to achieve eudaimonia, but rather to understand that they are 
sufficient for eudaimonia, even if not the superlative instantiation of eudaimonia. 
After the foregoing analysis, it should be undeniable that Aristotle did value 
theoria as the best activity for eudaimonia, and, in that sense, the exclusivist readers 
seem to be correct. However, a problem arises in that Aristotle’s discussion of the relative 
merits of theoria and the practical virtues for eudaimonia occurs on two levels, with one 
level being concerned solely with the individual activities and the other with these 
activities as part of a fully lived life. Expressed another way, it may be true that theoria 
attains the best measure of eudaimonia for a person, but it is not obvious that one should 
dedicate his or her whole life entirely and exclusively to theoria as exclusivist readers 
have argued. It is this point where most, but not all, of the disagreement has arisen 
between the inclusivist and exclusivists camps. Even though many inclusivist readers 
have couched their arguments in the claim that the activity of theoria should not be 
valued over the practical virtues,11 ultimately, their concern is over what the well-lived 
life will look like according to Aristotle and not simply what is the best activity a human 
can engage in. The majority of exclusivists have come to argue that because theoria is the 
                                                           
11
 Ackrill  argues for a moderate inclusivist position that is similar to my own. He is concerned with 
“treating the one [theoria] as more important but not incomparably more important than the other [practical 
virtue].” J.L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics ed. Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.33. 
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better activity, eudaimonia should therefore be understood exclusively in terms of 
theoria, with the practical virtues relegated solely to a support position. In this final 
section, I wish to challenge these exclusivist readers that find a place for the practical 
virtues only in the shadows of theoria. In its place, I will put forward a conception of the 
well-lived life from Aristotle that focuses on the significance of eudaimonia being a 
continuous activity over a complete lifetime in order to understand how the practical 
virtues are a necessary component for the well-lived life. In brief, the practical virtues are 
a crucial aspect of a well-lived life not because they support theoria, although they may, 
but rather they are valued as a means by which a human being can continually engage in 
a virtuous activity even in the times at which the person cannot be engaging in theoria. 
While with the activity of theoria a person is able to strive “to become immortal as far as 
that is possible and do [his or her] utmost to live in accordance with what is highest in us” 
(NE 1177b33), Aristotle admits that “such a life would be more than human” (NE 
1177b26, emphasis mine). For those times when a person must be “merely human” and 
lives in the company of other people, the practical virtues provide a means by which the 
person can continually engage in virtuous activity (NE 1178b6). It is for this reason that I 
label this reading as a “dominant inclusive” sense in that, while both theoria and the 
practical virtues play a part in the well-lived life, theoria nevertheless does have a 
privileged position in this conception because of its ability to be practiced more 
continually. 
For the exclusivist, the discussion in Book X about the superiority of theoria 
culminates in Aristotle’s claim that “eudaimonia is coextensive with theoria” (NE 
1178b28). The well-lived life in Aristotle is on this account wholly composed of the time 
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a person is engaging in theoria, and as long as that person is engaging in theoria, then 
that person can be said to be living well. But the question remains as to the role of the 
practical virtues on Aristotle’s account, and to this one prominent exclusivist, Richard 
Kraut (1989 and 1995), argues that the practical virtues will serve a purely supportive 
role for theoria. Referencing Aristotle’s claim that the person engaging in theoria will 
need to have a modicum of external goods in order to be able to satisfactorily perform 
theoria, Kraut argues that the practical virtues role in attaining eudaimonia will be to 
ensure that a person has the stability necessary for the continuous exercise of theoria.12 
The reasoning goes that since the practical virtues are derived from the composite nature 
of humans, their exercise already is in the realm of material well-being and therefore that 
one would expect that their particular role in eudaimonia would be to support the prime 
activity that is theoria. Theoria, when taken in isolation, is unable to obtain for a person 
the necessary material well-being due to the fact that it is concerned wholly and 
exclusively with the knowledge of “impractical” objects. Unable to be fully divine, 
human beings must utilize the excellences of the practical virtues in order to ensure that 
they can strive to the best of their ability for true eudaimonia, which is composed of 
theoria alone.  
The perennial problem for an exclusivist reader is that in highlighting how 
Aristotle privileges theoria, the exclusivist does so by valuing theoria to such an extreme 
that the practical virtues are interpreted solely in light of theoria. While it may be true 
that the practical virtues can support the free exercise of theoria, it seems wrong to 
thereby argue that they must be understood solely in this function and therefore be valued 
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 Kraut, “Reply to Professor Roche,” 145. 
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only in light of this supporting role. To do this is especially problematic since Aristotle 
has consistently argued that the practical virtues are to be valued as a concrete 
instantiation of virtuous activity in general, in much the same way as theoria. It is then 
clear that the practical virtues are not to be valued in light of theoria, but that instead they 
stand on their own as valuable in virtue of being a type of virtuous activity. Another 
exclusivist reader, Gabriel Richardson Lear (2004) has attempted to skirt the exclusivist 
problem of devaluing the practical virtues in light of theoria by arguing that the practical 
virtues can be understood as being both intrinsically valuable and instrumentally valuable 
because they are a “teleological approximation” of theoria. By “teleological 
approximation” Richardson Lear means that “the activity of practical reasoning is 
structurally analogous to the activity of theoretical reasoning,”13 that is, they are both 
instances of the reasoning well about the truth. It is her hope that by understanding the 
relationship between theoria and the practical virtues due to their analogous structure, 
one will be able to overcome what she terms the “problem of middle-level ends,” which 
is, as she considers it, the problem of how the practical virtues can be desired both for 
their own sake and for the sake of theoria, here identified exclusively with eudaimonia 
(Richardson Lear 9). The problematic assumption with her analysis, however, is in 
thinking that theoria has this exclusive claim when Aristotle clearly indicates that the 
practical virtues, when taken alone, can also achieve eudaimonia, even if admitted a 
“secondary” form of it. The practical virtues are valuable ultimately not because they are 
analogous to theoria, but rather both are valuable because they are instances of virtuous 
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 Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 107. 
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activities, and that is the conception of eudaimonia in Aristotle that Richardson Lear 
overlooks.14 
Contrary to these exclusivist attempts to fill out what a well-lived life would look 
like, I want to sketch a picture of a “dominant inclusive” view of the well-lived life that 
draws upon what I take to be a latent view of Aristotle’s in Book X. After having argued 
extensively for the superiority of theoria in Book X.7, Aristotle gives an aside that can be 
quite disappointing to someone who would hope to live a life in the manner that Aristotle 
sets out. In short, Aristotle argues a life solely composed of theoria is in some sense 
impossible for humans to live completely, or at least, that it would be something 
superhuman and so therefore extremely difficult for the vast majority of people to hope to 
live out (NE 1177b26-28). The problem, as Aristotle points out, is that the human person 
is a composite of both divine and animal life, and insofar as a person must live his or her 
life as a human being and not in emulation of the gods that person will have need of 
human virtue. As Aristotle puts it himself, “insofar as he is human and lives in the society 
of his fellow men, he chooses to act as virtue demands” (NE 1178b5-6). Instead of 
subjugating the practical virtues to the supremacy of theoria, Aristotle admits that there 
will be gaps in a person’s ability to engage in theoria continuously. If eudaimonia is 
indeed strictly to be identified with theoria, then it would seem that any time not spent in 
theoria would have to be understood as time not well-lived. The practical virtues, though, 
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 The consistent issue with exclusivist readers is that they attempt to find the value of the practical virtues 
in theoria. To do as such, however, rewrites the relationship that theoria and the practical virtues have to 
one another. Theoria is only valuable, that is, desired for its own sake, because it is an instance of virtuous 
activity. In much the same way, the practical virtues are valuable only as an instance of virtuous activity 
and expressly not because they somehow derive value from their relationship to theoria. 
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give Aristotle a means to ensure that the person striving for perfect eudaimonia by means 
of theoria will not be thrown back upon him- or herself when unable to do as such.  
While Aristotle encourages his audience to seek to live the divine life of theoria 
as much as possible, he never leaves behind the essential fact addressed in Book I that 
eudaimonia will be found with any virtuous activity. If theoria is all that a person has to 
turn to in order to achieve eudaimonia, then it seems that everyone will need to resign 
themselves to a woefully broken existence in which a person living-well is constantly 
punctuated by times in which he or she cannot fully engage in theoria. As an alternative 
to this picture of the well-lived life, integrating the practical virtues into a complete life, 
which also achieve eudaimonia, would provide a more consistent picture of what a well-
lived life would be like. The practical virtues are able to function as a stopgap means by 
which a person can continue to fully engage in an activity that qualifies for eudaimonia 
even at times when he or she can only be “merely human” and not engage in theoria. 
Here, the well-lived life for Aristotle will not look conspicuously different than the life of 
the average person. The eudaimon person will interact publically with friends and fellow 
citizens in a virtuous manner while privately the person would be able to dedicate his or 
her time fully to theoria. The interaction with other people is inevitable since the human 
being is by nature social, and the appeal to the practical virtues is a means by which the 
person can continuously and unreservedly live a well-lived life engaged in virtuous 
activity. How much or how little a person dedicates to theoria will, like all virtues, be 
partially dependent upon the constitution of that person’s soul. However, the fact that 
Aristotle even took the time for the discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics, instead of just 
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engaging in theoria himself, demonstrates that the social dimension of human life with 
the practical virtues are as crucial as a life fully engaged in theoria. 
The heart of Aristotle’s account of the well-lived life is the claim that one can 
attain eudaimonia only by means of virtuous activity. Those activities that fulfill the 
criteria of a virtuous activity will be unique in that they will be a locus of both the highest 
good and the best activity due to their nature as an energeia. Yet in searching for a 
concrete activity that humans can engage in in order to achieve eudaimonia, Aristotle in 
fact comes across two activities – theoria and the practical virtues. While theoria will, as 
it were, get better mileage as a means by which a person can continually live out a life 
fully engaged in eudaimonia, it is clear that the essential demand of the well-lived life is 
that it be one that is lived out virtuously. When theoria or the practical virtues are taken 
alone, it is true that the more fulfilling well-lived life will be the one that has the greatest 
extent of theoria. However, even that life will have gaps in which the person is unable to 
engage fully in theoria. The superlative well-lived life, as a life that is fundamentally 
marked by virtue, will then rely upon the practical virtues as a means by which a person 
can continually engage in virtuous activity even when he or she cannot engage in theoria. 

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